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IMPLICATIONS OF MEDICAL EDUCATION OF
OSTEOPATHS AND ALLOPATHS ON THE
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF CARE IN
MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE
ACTIONS
The law of negligence today animates medical professional liability
lawsuits.' Osteopathic2 as well as allopathic3 physicians are subject to
negligence liability.4 Traditionally, courts considered osteopathic and
allopathic physicians as members of different schools of medicine be-
cause of their diverse philosophical origins.5 This classification led
courts in most circumstances to hold allopaths and osteopaths to differ-
ent standards of care.6 As a result, osteopaths could potentially estab-
lish their own, perhaps lower, standard of care enabling them to reduce
their exposure to liability.7
This note examines the standard of care courts apply in medical neg-
ligence actions against allopathic and osteopathic physicians in light of
the current education and training of both groups. This note argues
1. Originally, medical liability actions sounded in contract. I C. FRAmNEL, J. ZIMMERLY &
R. PATrERSON, LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF PERSONAL INJURIES AND ALLIED SPECIAL-
TIES § 2.29 (3d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as LAwYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA]. Today, a physi-
cian may contract to cure a patient or achieve certain results, and is liable for breach of contract
for failure to achieve this cure or result. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 162 (4th ed. 1971).
Actions in tort, other than negligence, are also maintainable against a physician. See, e.g., Bowers
v. Talmage, 159 So.2d 888 (Fla. App. 1963) (misrepresentation or fraud); Bang v. Charles T.
Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958) (battery: absence of patient's consent); Pendle-
ton v. Burkhalter, 432 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (false imprisonment). For a general
discussion of these alternative actions, see Note, ios Afraid of Informed Consent? An Affinna-
N'e. Approach to the Medical Malpractice Criar, 44 BROOKLYN L. REv. 241 (1978).
2. Osteopathic physicians receive the degree of D.O. (doctor of osteopathy). Osteopathy is a
school of medicine and diagnosis that places emphasis on the relationship of the muscoskeletal
system to all other body parts. WESsTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1007 (2d ed. 1979). For a
discussion of osteopathic education and practice, see infra notes 82-102 and accompanying text.
See generall, Sprafta, Ward & Neff, What Characterizes an Osteopathic Princiole? Selected Re-
sponses to an Open Question, 80 J.Am. OSTEOPATHIC A. 29 (1981).
3. Allopathic physicians are those who receive an M.D. (medical doctor) degree. Strictly
defined, allopathy is the external treatment of disease by remedies that produce effects opposite to
or different from those the disease produces. WEaSTER's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 37 (2d ed.
1979). For a discussion of allopathic medicine, see infra notes 64-81 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 9-60 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 42-47 & 82-89 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 42-47 & 82-89 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
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that modem osteopathic education is sufficiently similar to allopathic
education to justify holding osteopaths and allopaths to the same stan-
dard of care.'
I. THE STANDARD OF CARE IN MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
An individual is not negligent unless the law imposes a duty on that
person to adhere to a certain standard of care.9 In ordinary negligence
cases courts usually express this standard as that of the conduct of "the
reasonable man of ordinary prudence."10 When, however, a person
possesses knowledge or skill superior to that of the ordinary reasonable
person, courts require adherence to a standard of care consistent with
the higher level of knowledge and skill. 11
This higher standard of care for knowledgeable or skilled individuals
has obvious implications for medical professionals. Courts require os-
teopathic and allopathic physicians to possess and use the degree of
skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of their profes-
sion. l" A physician is therefore liable for negligent acts which result
from a failure to apply the requisite skill and learning.13 A physician
8. See infra notes 115-133 and accompanying text.
9. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 143. The elements of a cause of action for negligence are
stated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965), which provides as follows:
The actor is liable for an invasion of an interest of another, if:
(a) the interest invaded is protected against unintentional invasion, and
(b) the conduct of the actor is negligent with respect to the other, or a class of persons
within which he is included, and
(c) the other has not so conducted himself as to disable himself from bringing an
action for such invasion.
10. W. PRossER, supra note I, at 150 (quoting Vaughn v. Menlove, 3 Bing. N.C. 457, 132
Eng. Rep. 490 (1837). See also McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Pracitioners, 12 VAND. L.
REv. 549, 558 (1959).
11. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 161. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 com-
ment ne (1965) addresses itself to this point:
m. Superior qualities of an actor. The standard of the reasonable man requires only
a minimum of attention, perception, memory, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment in
order to recognize the existence of the risk. If the actor has in fact more than the mini-
mum of these qualities, he is required to exercise the superior qualities that he has in a
manner reasonable under the circumstances. The standard becomes, in other words, that
of a reasonable man with such superior attributes.
12. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 161. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A
(1965). This statement is the most general articulation of the standard. Jurisdictions throughout
the country have defined and qualified this standard through use of the locality and same school
rules. See infra notes 27-60 and accompanying text.
13. W. PROSSER, supranote I, at 162. See Ayers v. Parry, 192 F.2d 181 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
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also incurs liability if he knew or should have known that his skill and
knowledge were insufficient to treat the patient's condition with a rea-
sonable possibility of success. 14 An undesirable result alone, without
proof that the physician deviated from the applicable standard of care,
is not a sufficient basis for actionable negligence.15
In ordinary negligence cases, evidence of custom is one non-conclu-
sive factor in determining whether the defendant adhered to the proper
standard of care. 6 In medical negligence cases courts generally hold
that custom is conclusive." It is often the sole evidence of the standard
of care.' 8 Proof that a respectable minority of physicians adhere to a
343 U.S. 980 (1951); Johnson v. Colp, 211 Minn. 245, 300 N.W. 791 (1941). The determination of
whether a physician has properly applied his knowledge and skill normally requires expert testi-
mony. Hopkins v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. Mo. 1957); Shea v. Phillips, 213 Ga. 269,
98 S.E.2d 552 (1957). But see Larsen v. Yelle, 310 Minn. 521, 246 N.W.2d 841 (1976) (increasing
lay familiarity with some medical techniques may make expert testimony unnecessary in some
awes). In some cases the injury or event leading to the malpractice action is such that a lay person
oould decide whether the result would have occurred in the absence of negligence. In these cases
the jury may infer negligence without expert testimony, using the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Evans v. Roberts, 172 Iowa 653, 154 N.W. 923 (1915) (doctor cut off patient's tongue during an
adenoid removal operation). See al o W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 164. The expert testimony
requirement may be a result of deference paid by the legal profession to the medical profession.
McCoid, supra note 10, at 608. For a discussion of the law's unusual deference to custom in
medical negligence actions, see infra notes 16-26 and accompanying text. See generally Morris,
The Role of Expert Testimony in the Trial of Negligence Issues, 26 TEx. L. REV. 1, 1-10 (1947).
14. See Simone v. Sabo, 37 Cal. 2d 253, 231 P.2d 19 (1951); Manion v. Tweedy, 257 Minn.
59, 100 N.W.2d 124 (1959). Courts refer to this requirement as the physician's duty to refer a
patient to a specialist-
15. See, ag, Siirila v. Barrios, 398 Mich. 576, 228 N.W.2d 801 (1975); Montana Deaconess
Hosp. v. Gratton, 169 Mont. 185, 545 P.2d 670 (1976). See generally Holder, Trends in Malpractice
Itigation, 53 YALE J. BIoLoGIcAL MED. 333, 340-41 (1980); McCoid, supra note 10, at 573.
16. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 166-68; McCoid, supra note 10, at 605-606.
17. McCoid, supra note 10, at 606. Dean Prosser notes that good medical practice becomes
practice which is customary and usual in the profession. W. PRossER, supra note 1, at 165. See
aLbo King In Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical Profession: The 'lccepted Practice"
Formula, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1213, 1235 (1975).
Commentators offer several explanations for the crucial role of custom in medical malpractice
actions. One expert states that most medical decisions regarding methods of treatment and diag-
mosis are beyond the knowledge of lay people. See Bovbjerg, The MedicalMalpractice Standard of
Care: HMOs and Customary Practice, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1375, 1389-1390. Another explanation ad-
vances a theory of implied representation. The physician by practicing medicine impliedly repre-
sents that he will follow customary methods. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 165. Prosser also
suggests that the respect of the legal profession for the medical profession explains the unusual
reliance on custom in medical negligence cases. Id A more innovative explanation, based on the
importance of risk factors in negligence law, is that custom indicates the most desirable level of
risk avoidance, based on cost and result. Bovbjerg, supra at 1390 (citing R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 69-70 (1973)).
18. See authorities cited supra note 17.
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particular practice is sufficient proof of acceptable custom. 9
Critics assert, however, that reliance on custom as the standard of
care may permit the entire medical industry legitimately to provide
substandard care.20 As a result, the Washington Supreme Court in
Helling v. Carej' stated that adherence to custom is not conclusive
proof that a physician's conduct meets the requisite standard of care.22
The court reasoned that while custom usually is reasonable conduct, it
can never be the strict measure of reasonableness.2 3 The court held
that despite uncontradicted expert testimony that the defendant had
adhered to the universal, customary practice of medical doctors in his
field, his conduct, under the circumstances, was negligent.' Other ju-
risdictions have adopted this position,25 holding that evidence of cus-
19. See Riddlesperger v. United States, 406 F. Supp. 617 (D. Ala. 1976); Leech v. Bralliar,
275 F. Supp. 897 (D. Ariz. 1967). See also King, supra note 17, at 1237. This aspect of medical
malpractice law would become more important if courts considered osteopaths and allopaths to be
members of the same school for purposes of the same school rule. See infra notes 42-60 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the same school rule. The "respectable minority" rule
would allow for cases in which osteopaths and allopaths might prescribe different treatments. As
there are over 21,000 osteopathic physicians in the United States today, osteopaths undoubtedly
should be considered a respectable minority of the medical profession. See infra notes 87 & 128-
131 and accompanying text.
20. Bovbjerg, supra note 17, at 1390, 1391. See generally McCoid, sxTra note 10, at 606;
Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1147, 1153-1154 (1942). Customary practice,
however, can just as easily set the standard of care at an unnecessarily high level, resulting in
higher costs to the patient-consumer and perhaps unnecessary medical tests and treatment.
Bovbjerg, supra note 17, at 1380-1390.
21. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
22. Id at 516, 519 P.2d at 982.
23. Id The court relied on Judge Learned Hand's pronouncement of the law in The T.J.
Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932):
[I]n most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strctlit is never its
measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available
devices. It never may set its own tests, however persuasive by its usages. Courts must in
the end say what is required; there are precautions so imperative that even their univer-
sal disregard will not excuse their omission.
Id at 740.
24. Helling, 83 Wash. 2d at 516, 519 P.2d at 982.
25. See e.g., Morgan v. Shepard, 91 Ohio L. Abs. 579, 188 N.E.2d 808 (1963). The Morgan
court stated that methods customarily employed by physicians do not furnish a test which is con-
trolling on the question of negligence. Id at 593, 188 N.E.2d at 816. AccordLundahl v. Rockford
Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 93 Ill. App. 2d 461, 235 N.E.2d 671 (1968). In Toth v. Community Hosp.,
22 N.Y.2d 255, 239 N.E.2d 368, 292 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1967), the New York Court of Appeals articu-
lated a standard slightly different than custom. The Toth court held that the standard of care to
which defendant-physicians must adhere is measured not by compliance with custom but by com-
pliance with accepted medical practice. One critic has argued, however, that the Toth court did
not base its decision on the newly articulated standard, but on the defendant's actual knowledge
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss2/5
MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
tom may be unacceptable because it is inadequate in light of the
knowledge possessed by the profession concerning the risks involved in
a procedure or in light of improved techniques promising greater suc-
cess than the customary technique. 26
A further qualification on the standard of care calculus is the locality
rule. Courts employ the locality rule to limit the geographic area from
which witnesses may show evidence of custom. In its original form the
locality rule provided that a court can hold a physician only to that
degree of skill and care possessed and exercised by other physicians
practicing in the same area.27 Courts reasoned that doctors in small
rural communities did not have the same resources and educational
opportunities as doctors in metropolitan areas and thus that it was un-
fair to hold all doctors to the same standard of care.28
From its inception, strict usage of the locality rule engendered
problems. Doctors in the same community were hesitant to testify
against one another. A conspiracy of silence was created.29 Moreover,
the rule enabled a small group of physicians in one area to establish an
inferior standard of care.3" The development of advanced communica-
tion and transportation devices, however, led to the eventual decline of
that the (customary) treatment administered to the patient was at best questionable and probably
unsafe. King, supra note 17, at 1236-37.
Although the Washington state legislature passed a statute purporting to overrule the decision
in Helling v. Carey, see WASH. REv. CODE § 4-24-290 (Supp. 1982), the Washington Supreme
Court in Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979) reaffirmed Helling stating that
"reasonable prudence may require a... standard of care [higher] than that exercised by the
relevant professional group." Id at 253, 595 P.2d at 924.
26. See King, supra note 17, at 1248.
27. See e.g., Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131 (1888), overruled in Brune v. Belinkoff, 354
Mass. 102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968). See also Loftus v. Layden, 391 A.2d 749 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978);
Teffi v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46 (1870). To obtain evidence of the local standard of care, courts require
that only experts from the same locality as the defendant serve as witnesses. See Force v. Gregory,
63 Conn. 167, 27 A. 1116 (1893); Burk v. Foster, 114 Ky. 20, 69 S.W. 1096 (1902).
28. Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 77, 431 P.2d 973, 977 (1967). See McCoid,
mpra note 10, at 569; Note, An Evaluation of Changes in Medical Standard of Care, 23 VAND. L.
REv. 729, 731-33 (1970). At the time of the development of the locality rule, there were many
medical schools in America. Only about half of these were accredited. Medical education stan-
dards varied tremendously from one location to the next. Id at 733 n.17. Although the reasons
behind the locality rule are applicable to other professions, courts traditionally applied the rule
only to doctors. Id at 731. See Wade, TheAttorney's Liabilityfor Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REV.
755, 762, 763 (1959).
29. Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 78, 431 P.2d 973, 977 (1967). See W. PROSSER,
supra note 1, at 164; Note, supra note 28, at 731.
30. See authorities cited supra note 29.
Number 21
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the rule.3 These advances facilitated the standardization of medical
training and created more opportunities for continuing medical educa-
tion through travel to major medical facilities and access to profes-
sional medical journals or local medical seminars.32
Recognizing these changes, some courts gradually replaced the origi-
nal "same" locality rule with a "similar" locality rule.33 Under this
version of the locality rule a physician's conduct is measured against
the standard of care exercised by physicians practicing in an area with
educational opportunities similar to those in defendant's area.34 Other
courts hold that locality is merely one factor to consider in determining
the appropriate standard of care.35 A few courts have advanced a
"same class" standard which holds that it is not the physician's locality
which determines the applicable standard of care but rather the de-
31. See Harris, Survey of Medical Communication Sources Avalablefor Continuing Physiclan
Education, 41 J. MED. EDuc. 737 (May-July 1966).
3Z- Since 1942, the American Medical Association (AMA) has accredited medical schools on
a national basis. Note, supra note 28, at 733 n.17. Some states require evidence of continuing
medical education as a prerequisite to reregistration of a physician's medical license. The Impact
of Mandatory Continuing Medical Education, 239 J. A.M.A. 2663, 2663-2666 (1978). See also infra
notes 64-66 & 77-80 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Borowski v. Von Solbrig, 14 Ill. App. 3d 672, 303 N.E.2d 146 (1973) a'd, 60 11.
2d 418, 328 N.E.2d 301 (1975) (standard of care was that of physician in same or similar commu-
nity or hospital). For other jurisdictions in which the similar locality rule is in effect, see Annot.,
99 A.L.R. 3d 1133 (1981). In some states the legislature has modified or abolished the locality
rule. See, eg., Wis. STAT. § 147-14(2)(a) (1955). The "similar" locality rule eliminates the prob-
lem of doctors' unwillingness to testify against fellow physicians in their community. Note, Over-
coming the "Conspiracy of Silence'! Statutory and Common Law Innovations, 45 MNN. L. Rnv.
1019, 1043-1045 (1961).
34. See, eg., Geraty v. Kaufman, 115 Conn. 563, 162 A. 33 (1932); Flock v. J.C. Palumbo
Fruit Co., 63 Idaho 220, 118 P.2d 707 (1941); Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 294 N.W. 183 (1940);
Hadgson v. Bigelow, 335 Pa. 497, 7 A.2d 338 (1939). In Tvedt, a small-town practitioner defend-
ing a malpractice claim argued that he did not have adequate x-ray facilities to examine the plain-
tifl's fracture properly. The court held that the defendant had access to better x-ray facilities in
nearby towns and should have used those facilities. Tved, 70 N.D. 338, 349, 294 N.W. 183, 188
(1940).
35. Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967). In Pederson the court
stated that the locality rule had lost all current viability. The court stated that "negligence cannot
be excused on the ground that others in the same locality practice the same kind of negligence."
Id at 78, 431 P.2d at 977. For a listing of jurisdictions following the Pederson approach, see
Annot., 99 A.L.R. 3d 1133 (1981).
Courts take an approach similar to that in Pederson in cases involving a treatment that is uni-
versally the same. In these cases courts do not take locality into account. See, e.g., Riley v.
Layton, 329 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1964). In Riley, a case involving a fractured arm, the court permit-
ted a San Francisco doctor to testify as to the standard of care required of a doctor in a small Utah
town. Id at 57. See also Teig v. St. Johns Hosp., 63 Wash. 2d 369, 387 P.2d 527 (1963).
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fendant's class as a physician.3 6
The "same class" standard is a national approach to standard of care
determination. Almost all courts employ this standard in determining
the requisite standard of care for the medical specialist. 37  Courts re-
quire specialists to exercise a standard of care commensurate with the
knowledge and skill possessed by like specialists.38 The policy behind
this exception to the locality rule is that the education of specialists
across the nation is approximately uniform.3 9 The American Medical
Association (AMA) and affiliated specialty boards certify specialists on
a national basis.40 Further, recognized medical specialties have specific
training requirements.4' These requirements assure minimum stan-
dards of education, knowledge, and skill for specialists across the coun-
try, rendering the locality rule as applied to specialists a useless
anachronism.
36. Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1970); Farrow v. Health Services Corp., 604 P.2d 474
(Utah 1979).
37. See Belk v. Schweizer, 268 N.Y. 350, 149 N.E.2d 565 (1966). The minority approach
holds specialists to a standard of care of specialists in the same or similar locality. See, e.g.,
Crovella v. Cochrane, 102 So. 2d 307, 311 (Fla. App. 1958).
Medical specialists are usually defined as physicians who apply themselves to the study of a
particular disease, organ, or injury of the body. B. OPPENHEIMER, A TREATISE ON MEDICAL
JURISPRUDENCE 32 (1935). A medical speciality board need not certify a physician to subject that
physician to a specialist's standard of care. See Simpson v. Davis, 219 Kan. 584, 549 P.2d 950
(1976) (physician subject to specialist standard when he holds himself out as a specialist). See
generally LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 1, § 240. If a defendant has represented
himself as having less skill and knowledge than the average member of the profession, and the
patient accepts treatment on that basis, the standard of care will be modified accordingly. W.
PROSSER, supra note 1, at 163. In a trial against a specialist, however, another specialist need not
testify as to the standard of care. A general practitioner can testify against a specialist if the
plaintiff shows that the witness-practitioner has knowledge of the standard of care customary for
the particular treatment at issue. See, e.g., Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A.2d 680
(1953).
38. See, e.g., Naccaroto v. Grob, 384 Mich. 248, 254, 180 N.W.2d 788, 791 (1970). See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 299A comment d (1965); W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 163; LAw-
YER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 1, at § 240.
39. See infra note 40.
40. Future Directions for Medical Education-Report on the Council on Medical Education,
Adopted June 15, 1982, by the American Medical Association House of Delegates, 248 J. A.M.A.
3225, 3226-3232 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Medical Education]. Physicians are "board eligible"
when they have completed the training requirements (residency and practice requirements) of
their chosen specialties. Physicians become "board certified" when they pass the national exami-
nation given by the American Board of Medical Specialties and satisfy practice and continuing
education requirements. Id See LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 1, § 240. See also
infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
41. Medical Education, supra note 40, at 3225.
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A final qualification on standard of care determination is the same
school rule. Like the locality rule, the same school rule limits those
who can testify against a defendant physician. The rule states that a
court should judge physicians according to the principles of the school
of medicine that they follow.42 A school of medicine must be recog-
nized, with legitimate, definite principles43 to come within the ambit of
the same school rule. Under a strict form of the rule a physician's con-
duct is not negligent unless the plaintiff proves, by testimony of a mem-
ber of the physician's own school, that the conduct was below the
proper level of care44 as defined by practitioners of that school.
The origins of the same school rule are similar to those of the locality
rule. It arose when medical education was neither standardized nor
formal.45 The field of medicine included practitioners who had a vari-
ety of theoretical approaches to the treatment of disease.46 Courts be-
lieved that a jury would be unable to make valid judgments about the
advantages or disadvantages of a particular school's method of
treatment.47
Many jurisdictions have adopted a modified version of the same
school rule that allows practitioners of different schools to testify if the
physician testifying has knowledge or expertise of the other school's
practices. 48 To determine what constitutes knowledge or expertise for
this purpose, courts compare the nature of the witness's and the defend-
ant's medical practice, and the witness's knowledge and experience
outside his practice.49
42. Force v. Gregory, 63 Conn. 167, 27 A. 1116 (1893); Patten v. Wiggin, 51 Me. 594 (1862).See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 299A comment f (1965); W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 162.
43. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 163. According to Dean Prosser, "no quack, charlatan or
crackpot can set himself up as a 'school' and so apply his individual ideas." Id. Courts have
discretion to recognize or not recognize schools of medicine, but when a school has legislative
recognition the statute requires the court to accept that school as a legitimate one. W. PROSSER,
supra note 1, at 162; McCoid, supra note 10, at 563. See also Cummins v. Donley, 173 Kan. 463,
249 P.2d 695 (1952) (osteopathy legislatively recognized and therefore a school).
44. See Hopkins v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. Mo. 1957). See also authorities
cited infra note 50.
45. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
46. McCoid, supra note 10, at 562.
47. Force v. Gregory, 63 Conn. 167, 171, 27 A. 1116, 1117 (1893).
48. See Siirila v. Barrios, 398 Mich. 576, 248 N.W.2d 1711 (1976); Grainger v. Still, 187 Mo.
197, 85 S.W. 1114 (1905).
49. See, eg., Haisenleder v. Reeder, 114 Mich. App. 258, 318 N.W.2d 634 (1982). The
Haisenleder court held that an allopathic medical specialist in pediatrics, epidemiology, and com-
municable diseases was competent to testify against an osteopath emergency room physician,
[Vol. 62:289
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A number of courts have adopted what has become known as the
treatment exception to the same school rule." This exception permits
the testimony of a physician of a school different from defendant's
when the testimony relates to a method of treatment, care, or diagnosis
for which the principles of the different schools are, or should be, the
same.51 In a recent case employing this exception, Bivens v. Detroit Os-
teopathic Hospital," the Michigan Court of Appeals held that when
certain physiological practices usually result in death, a witness-practi-
tioner is competent to testify about these practices even if from a school
other than that of the defendant. 3 The court reasoned that if such
practices would be likely to result in death, it must be assumed that the
standard of all schools would be to avoid such activities.54
Few courts offer any concrete guidance for application of the treat-
ment exception. When a certain medical practice is well established
and standardized, such as the treatment of fractures, courts will not
invoke the same school rule.55  Practices which trigger this exception
include cataract operations, the use of x-rays, diagnosis of disease or
injury, and post-operative care of a patient. 6 The Missouri Supreme
where the plaintiff proved that the allopathic doctor had emergency room experience and that he
knew of the standard of care for osteopathic emergency room doctors. Id at 263-265, 318 N.W.2d
at 637-38. Although the court did not explicitly state the basis for its ruling, the opinion suggests
that when certain treatments are universally regarded as proper, a practitioner of one school may
testify against a practitioner of another school. The allopathic physician in Haisenleder stated that
the emergency room standard of care was the same for medical osteopathic doctors. Id. at 263,
318 N.W.2d 637. Haisenleder represents the "treatment" exception to the same school rule. See
infra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
50. Riley v. Layton, 329 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1964); Musachia v. Terry, 140 So. 2d 605 (Fla.
App. 1962); Grainger v. Still, 187 Mo. 197, 85 S.W. 1114 (1905).
51. See supra note 49.
52. 77 Mich. App. 478, 258 N.W.2d 527 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 403 Mich. 820, 282
N.W.2d 926 (1978).
53. Id at 483, 258 N.W.2d at 530.
54. Id
55. Riley v. Layton, 329 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1964).
56. See, eg., Musachia v. Terry, 140 So. 2d 605, 607 (Fla. App. 1962) (diagnosis); Foster v.
Thornton, 125 Fla. 699, 706-07, 170 So. 459, 462-63 (1936) (x-rays); Hundley v. Martinez, 151 W.
Va. 977, 995, 158 S.E.2d 159, 169 (1967) (cataract operation). In Musachi4 the court permitted an
allopathic physician to testify against an osteopathic physician. The court stated as follows:
[With reference to internal injuries including fractured ribs, perforated intestines and
generalized peritonitis, which resulted from a severe beating, the principles of the two
schools should concur as to diagnosis. The same is applicable to the treatment since it
was not made to appear that the schools to which the witness and the defendants be-
longed required and employed different treatment for those conditions.
140 So. 2d at 607. See also Reed v.Laughlin, 332 Mo. 424, 58 S.W.2d 440 (1933).
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Court in Grainger v. Still,57 identified at least one situation requiring
the invocation of the treatment exception. In Grainger, the court al-
lowed an allopathic physician to testify against an osteopathic physi-
cian in a hip injury case when the plaintiff proved that allopathic and
osteopathic schools used the same textbooks.58 The court held that
when osteopaths and allopaths are educated with the same books, the
same school rule is not applicable because "the rules and practices of
both are the same. ' 59 In broad terms the court's holding means that if
members of traditionally different schools receive the same education,
courts presume that diagnosis and treatment are sufficiently similar for
the members of different schools to testify against each other concern-
ing the proper standard of care.60
II. THE STATE OF MEDICAL EDUCATION: ALLOPATHIC AND
OSTEOPATHIC PHYSICIANS
Assumptions about a physician's education, training, knowledge,
and skill underlie the two most significant qualifications of the general
standard of care applicable in medical malpractice actions, the locality
and same school rules.61 Both rules first appeared when medical edu-
cation was poorly organized.62 As medical education has become stan-
57. 187 Mo. 197, 85 S.W. 1114 (1905). Grainger is still good law, and is one of the most
frequently cited references for the treatment exception to the same school rule.
58. Id at 224-25, 85 S.W. at 1123.
59. Id The court's exact language is as follows:
If it be true that osteopaths teach the same textbooks as other schools of medicine, then
there can be no reason why a physician of any other school is not a competent witness to
express an opinion as to the correctness of the diagnosis and treatment of hip disease by
an osteopath, because pro hac vice the rules and practices of both are the same.
Id The court provided no reason why it limited its holding '!pro hac vicd' (for this one particular
occasion).
60. Id Increasing numbers of courts are holding that osteopaths and allopaths are compe-
tent to testify for, or against, each other. See Note, Medical Maipractice-Expert Teslimony, 60
Nw. U.L. REv. 834, 840 (1966).
61. Courts developed the locality rule to protect small town rural doctors, who had little
access to opportunities for education and advanced treatment facilities, from being judged by the
standards of the urban doctor, who was assumed to have better opportunities to keep up with the
state of the art in medicine. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text. The same school rule
arose during a time when a variety of medical philosophies were in common usage. See supra
note 46 and accompanying text. Only in the twentieth century has allopathic medicine become
dominant. See McCoid, supra note 10, at 562. Courts designed the rule to allow practitioners with
a given set of medical principles to be judged by their own standards. See supra notes 45-47 and
accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 28 & 45 and accompanying text.
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dardized, the number of cases falling within the exceptions to these
rules has increased.63  The changes in the locality and same school
rules during the twentieth century reflect judicial recognition of the di-
mini.hed utility of these rules in light of the nature of today's medical
education and practice.
A. Allopathic Education
Only in the twentieth century did a formal system of allopathic med-
ical education develop. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
most physicians had only a high school education, followed possibly by
an additional year attending lectures and demonstrations at a medical
school or apprenticed to a practicing physician." In the late nineteenth
century, John Hopkins University School of Medicine established med-
ical education as a post-graduate discipline, creating the system that
exists today.6" A national system for accrediting medical schools did
not come into existence until 1942.66
Currently, allopathic medical education is exclusively post-graduate.
Although admissions requirements vary slightly among medical
schools, most schools require undergraduate preparation in biology, in-
organic and organic chemistry, and physics.67 Medical school itself
consists of four years of study. The first two years center around the
study of basic medical sciences, such as anatomy, physiology, biochem-
istry, microbiology, and pharmacology. 6 Toward the end of the sec-
ond year, most schools offer courses in physical diagnosis, medicine,
surgery, and pediatrics.69 The purpose of the first two years is to pro-
vide an education in general history, diagnosis, and management of
common diseases.70 The third and fourth years provide students with
clinical experience.71 Usually these years consist of clerkships in
medicine, obstetrics and gynecology, surgery, pediatrics, and psychia-
63. See supra notes 33-41 & 48-60 and accompanying text.
64. LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 1, § 1.1.
65. LAYWER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, jupra note 1, § 1.1.
66. Note, supra note 28, at 733 n.17.
67. Medical Education, supra note 40, at 3226-27. For a description of each medical schoors
requirements and curriculum, see ASSOCIATION OF AMERiCAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, 1980-1981
MEDICAL SCHOOL ADMISSION REQunI.ENis AND CunmcuLum DmRORY (1981).
68. See LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, upra note 1, § 1.2; MedcalEducation, Supra note
40, at 3228.
69. See authorities cited supra note 68.
70. Medical Education, xupra note 40, at 3230.
71. Id
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try.72 The Liaison Committee on Medical Education (LCME) is re-
sponsible for accrediting the medical school curriculum. 7 3
Twenty-three residency review committees, jointly sponsored by the
AMA and various medical specialty boards, evaluate and, in certain
instances accredit, internships, residencies, and other programs of grad-
uate medical education.74 Almost all United States medical school
graduates enter residency programs ranging in duration from four to
seven years.75
The American Board of Medical Specialties currently recognizes
fifty-seven areas of general or special certification.76 Well over half of
all United States medical school graduates receive Specialty Board cer-
tification.77 Many specialty boards require doctors to receive continu-
ing medical education in order to retain their certificate.78 Some state
boards have similar requirements for renewal of general medical
licenses.79 The Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Educa-
tion accredits continuing medical education programs. s0 Thus, over
the past century medical education and training has become lengthier,
more competitive, highly standardized, and significantly more
specialized."1
B. Osteopathic Education
Osteopathic medicine originated in the late nineteenth century. Dr.
Andrew Taylor Still, a physician trained at the Kansas City College of
Physicians and Surgeons, 2 became disillusioned with traditional
medicine and began further inquiry into the causes of disease. He de-
veloped new principles and practices and in 1892 he established the
72. Id
73. Id at 3237-3238.
74. Id
75. Id at 3232. Increasingly, medical professionals view internships simply as part of a resi-
dency designed to train a doctor as a specialist. Id at 3230.
76. Id at 3225.
77. Id at 3237-3238.
78. The Impact of Mandatory Continuing Medical Education, supra note 32, at 2666-67.
79. Id.
80. Id The American Medical Association, the American Hospital Association, the Associa-
tion for Hospital Medical Education and the Federation of State Medical Boards of the United
States jointly sponsor this group.
81. See supra notes 64-80 and accompanying text.
82. L. WEISS & A. SPENcE, Osteopathic Medicine, in A GuiDn TO THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS
4 (1973).
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first osteopathic medical college.8 3
Although osteopathy began as a medical reform movement, today it
is an accepted school of medicine.3 4 In all fifty states osteopaths are
eligible for licenses for unlimited practice of medicine and surgery."
Further, osteopathic medicine is the fastest growing health care profes-
sion in the United States. 6 In 1970 there were 13,500 doctors of oste-
opathy actively practicing in the United States, representing
approximately five percent of the medical profession; 7 by November
1983, this number had increased to 21,578.88
The nature of osteopathic medicine, and consequently the nature of
osteopathic education, has changed during this century. Today osteo-
pathic education incorporates traditional medical science as well as os-
teopathic principles.8 9 The American Osteopathic Association (AOA)
currently accredits fourteen osteopathic colleges of medicine.90 Today,
6,133 osteopathic students attend these schools.91 Experts expect the
number of students to grow as the number of osteopathic colleges con-
tinues to increase. 92
Like allopathic medical education, osteopathic education is post-
graduate.93 Admission to a college of osteopathic medicine requires
83. Id at 4, 12. Established medical schools refused to teach Stilrs methods. For more infor-
mation about the history of osteopathic medicine, see G. NORTHRUP, OSTEOPATHIC MEDICINE:
AN AMERICAN REFORMATION (1972); A. STILL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1897).
84. See infra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
85. Fact Sheet: Dec. 1982, D.O. 1, 98 (Dec. 1982). This was not always the case. For many
years some states limited the practice of osteopathy by prohibiting osteopaths from prescribing
drugs or performing surgery. L. WEIss & A. SPENCE, supra note 82, at 4.
86. LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 1, § 1.19.
87. L. WEIsS & A. SPENCE, supra note 82, at 5.
88. Fact Sheet: Dec. 1983, D.O. 1, 109 (Dec. 1983).
89. Fact Sheet: Dec. 1983, supra note 88, at 109 (Dec. 1983). The modem definition of the
osteopathic principle is that the body is a self-regulating unit, with structure and function inter-
related. Sprafka, Ward & Neff, supra note 2, at 29. For a slightly outdated definition, see Mc-
Coid, supra note 10, at 560.
90. Fact Sheet: Dec. 1982, supra note 85, at 98. A fifteenth osteopathic college is in the
accreditation process. The American Osteopathic Association (A.O.A.) has had standards for
approving osteopathic colleges since 1902. For a list of these A.O.A. accredited schools, see LAW-
YER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, upra note 1, § 1.19.
91. Fact Sheet: Dec. 1983, supra note 88, at 109.
92. Greenman, Osteopathic Medicine--Origins and Outlook, 68 POSTGRADUATE MED. 31, 33
(1980). From 1982 to 1983 the number of students enrolled in osteopathic schools increased from
5,811 to 6,133. Fact Sheet: Dec. 1983, supra note 88, at 109.
93. Although some osteopathic colleges admit students with only three years of preprofes-
sional training, 97% of all osteopathic students have a bachelor's degree. Fact Sheet: Dec. 1982,
supra note 87, at 97.
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undergraduate study of physics, biology, inorganic and organic chemis-
try, and English. For two years students study anatomy, physiology,
chemistry, pathology, microbiology, immunology, and pharmacology.
Students spend the next two years studying clinical subjects, including
surgery, pediatrics, obstetrics and gynecology, and emergency care.94
Schools incorporate osteopathic principles into the general study pro-
gram.9" The AOA requires a twelve-month internship following the
regular four year course of study. 96 Further, the AOA supports contin-
uing medical education and fosters it through its practice affiliates in
over twenty fields.97 Osteopathic physicians can become certified spe-
cialists, but approximately seventy-five percent are involved in the
practice of family medicine. 98
In the past, allopathic hospitals have denied hospital privileges to
osteopathic physicians.99 This is still true in certain areas. Many courts
have upheld the right of both public and private hospitals to deny staff
privileges to doctors of osteopathy solely because they are not medical
doctors. Other courts have held that a denial on that basis alone is
impermissible. °° Denial of hospital privileges to osteopathic doctors is
significant because only 152 AOA accredited osteopathic hospitals exist
in the entire United States. 10 1 A denial of hospital privileges makes it
94. Id. See Powell & Feinstein, AnAternatve to the 1- Year Rotating Inernshp in the Osieo.
pathic Profesion, 81 J.A. OSTEOPATmC A. 31, 38 (1982).
95. Fact Sheet: Dec. 1982, supra note 85, at 97.
96. Powell & Feinstein, supra note 94, at 38.
97. Fact Sheet: Dec. 1982, supra note 85, at 98.
98. L. WEiss & A. SPENcE, supra note 82, at 5.
99. Blackstone, TheA.Mf.. andthe Osteopaths: A Study offthe Power of Organized Medlc/ne,
22 AirrrusT BULL. 405, 414 (1977). Increasingly, allopathic hospitals are beginning to allow
osteopaths to participate in A.M.A. approved internship and residency programs. In 1980 there
were 787 graduates of osteopathic medical schools enrolled in A.M.A. approved graduate medical
education programs. By 1982 this number had increased to 1,040. Crowley, Graduate Medical
Education in the United States, 250 J.A.M.A. 1541, 1545 (1983). The number of graduates of
osteopathic medical schools in 1983 was 1,317. Fact Sheet: Dec. 1983, supra note 88, at 109.
100. For cases involving hospital privileges at public hospitals, see Richardson v. City of
Miami, 144 Fla. 294, 198 So. 51 (1940) (requirement that public hospital staff members be gradu-
ates of an A.M.A. approved medical school not improper). But V.c Stribling v. Jolley, 241 Mo.
App. 1123,253 $.W.2d 519 (1952) (hospital cannot exclude a physician from use of public hospital
facilities based upon unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory rules). For cases involving private
hospitals, see Berman v. Florida Medical Center, Inc., 600 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1979) (requirement
that physicians complete A.M.A. residency programs before appointment to staff held valid). But
cf. Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 NJ. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963) (where private hospital was the
only hospital in the area it could not deny staff privileges to a doctor of osteopathy on the sole
grounds that he had not graduated from an A.M.A. approved medical school).
101. Fact Sheet: Dec 1983, supra note 88, at 109.
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difficult for osteopaths to offer complete m~dical services.1 2 In addi-
tion, denial forecloses to the osteopath the educational advantages that
may come from working with fellow physicians.
C. The Relationship Between Allopathic and Osteopathic Medicine
Today
The AMA and the AOA are separate and distinct entities. Profes-
sional relations between the two groups have not always been harmoni-
ous. 10 3 For many years, allopathic medical doctors viewed osteopathics
as cult practitioners. 10 The opening to osteopaths of internships and
residencies in AMA accredited hospitals has helped osteopaths gain le-
gitimacy as physicians.' As early as 1955 a committee of the AMA,
along with five medical school deans, made a study of osteopathic
schools.' °6 This committee concluded that the educational require-
ments for admission to osteopathic schools were the same as those for
allopathic schools and the curriculum at osteopathic schools, including
both basic science and clinical training, was substantially similar to that
of allopathic schools.10 7
Indications exist that allopathic medical professionals believe that
osteopaths are sufficiently competent to be classified with allopathic
doctors. In 1966 the Secretary to the Texas Board of Medical Examin-
ers stated that no difference exists in the medical and surgical ability of
osteopathic and allopathic physicians.108 In 1962 California gave os-
teopaths the opportunity to exchange their D.O. (doctor of osteopathy)
suffix for an M.D. (medical doctor) suttix.'0 9 At the same time Califor-
102. Blackstone, supra note 99, at 414. This explains why so many osteopathic physicians are
engaged in family practice, in which the need for complex hospital facilities and equipment is less
imperative than in other medical specialties. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
103. See generally Blackstone, supra note 99, at 410-414. Blackstone posits that the A.M.A.
resents the intrusion of osteopaths into the virtual monopoly alopaths maintain in the health care
field. Id.
104. Id
105. Crowley, supra note 99, at 1545.
106. Comment, Expert Testimony in MedicalMalpractice Cases, 17 U. MIAMI L. RPv. 182, 186
n.27 (1962) (citing Proceedings of the Atlantic City Meeting, Report of Reference Committee on
Sections and Section Work, 158 J.A.M.A. 735 (1955)). The A.M.A. membership did not approve
this report. Id.
107. Id
108. Epstein, Limitations on the Scope of Practice of Osteopathic Physicians, 32 Mo. L. REv.
354, 372 (1967).
109. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2396 (Dering 1975). Other states have taken similar action.
See Update, 73 J. A. OSTEOPATmC A. 790, 792 (1974). Washington established a "medical col-
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nia denied full licensure to any osteopathic doctors not already li-
censed. 110 In 1974, however, the California Supreme Court required
the state to restore osteopathic licensing.11'
In 1968 the AMA itself proposed a merger with the AOA. The
AOA, however, opposed the merger.' 2 While allopathic physicians
may be interested in asserting control, via merger, over an increasingly
strong competitor, osteopathic physicians are interested in preserving
professional identity and heritage. Osteopathy today still stresses its
philosophy of medicine.m13
III. CONCLUSIONS
Courts, pursuant to the same school rule, generally must hold osteo-
paths to that standard of care possessed by practioners of osteopathic
medicine. 114 The treatment exception to this rule arises when the medi-
cal treatment advocated by one school is, or should be, the same as that
of another."' Over the years courts have held that many common
medical practices and treatments fall within this exception to the same
school rule." 6
Today, allopathic and osteopathic medical students receive virtually
identical medical science and clinical medicine training. 117 Internships
and residencies in allopathic hospitals are open to osteopathic and allo-
pathic medical school graduates, although acceptance into these pro-
grams may be more difficult for osteopathic school graduates."1
Access to hospital facilities may also be more limited to the osteopathic
physician." 9 Both the AMA and AOA support continuing medical ed-
ucation. 20 Basic admissions requirements for allopathic and osteo-
lege" for doctors of osteopathy at which, after a short spell of study, the D.O.'s received M.D.
degrees. See Blackstone, supra note 99, at 421.
110. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2396 (Deering 1975).
111. D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, 11 Cal. 3d 1, 520 P.2d 10, 112 Cal. Rptr. 786
(1974).
112. Eiorial, 68 J. A. OSTEOPATHIC A., 445-47 (1969). See Epstein, supra note 108, at 370
n.115.
113. See supra notes 89 & 103 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 42-47 & 82-89 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 68-72, 93-97 & 107 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 78-80 & 97 and accompanying text.
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pathic medical schools are the same,' 2' and both have become
significantly more standardized since the beginning of this century.122
Currently there is little substantive difference between allopathic and
osteopathic education. Though osteopathic schools do teach osteo-
pathic principles, these principles comprise only three to four percent
of the curriculum.'23
It is questionable whether the small differences existing between allo-
pathic and osteopathic medical education are sufficient to sustain osteo-
pathic medicine as a school distinct from allopathic medicine for
purposes of medical negligence litigation. If the standard of care in
negligence cases is based on the knowledge and skill of the actor, then
courts should hold schools that possess the same knowledge and skill to
the same standard of care. The education and experience of allopathic
and osteopathic physicians is so substantially similar today that hold-
ing them to different standards of care serves no valid purpose. 24 Al-
though perhaps at the beginning of the century requiring osteopaths to
exercise the degree of care required of allopaths was unfair,125 current
curricula, which eliminates most of the distinctions between the
schools, demand that result.' To hold otherwise may enable osteo-
paths, through a conspiracy of silence, to establish a lower standard of
care for their profession.12 1
Placing osteopaths and allopaths under one roof for purposes of
medical negligence litigation would not sound the death knell to those
121. See supra notes 67 & 93 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 81 & 89-90 and accompanying text.
123. See Powell & Feinstein, supra note 94, at 38.
124. See infra notes 125-127 and accompanying text. Today, considering allopaths and osteo-
paths as members of different schools for purposes of the same school rule is logically inconsistent
with the theoretical basis of the rule. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 42-47 & 83-84 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 42-47 & 83-84 and accompanying text. Further, the Federal Rules of
Evidence support the notion that courts should allow osteopaths and allopaths to testify against
each other concerning the applicable standard of care. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides as
follows:
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qual~ied as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.
FE. R. EvID. 702 (emphasis added). The rule suggests that if osteopaths and allopaths are simi-
larly qualified because of their similar education, training, experience, knowledge, and skill, that
they are from different "schools" does not bar them from serving against each other as expert
witnesses in malpratice actions.
127. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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osteopathic principles which could evidence themselves in some type of
medical treatment. Although customary medical practice generally is
conclusive evidence of the proper standard of care, alternative medical
practices accepted by a respectable minority of the profession also suf-
fice as evidence of due care. 128  Osteopathic physicians constitute a
small but rapidly growing percentage of all medical practitioners. 129 If
osteopaths are considered a respectable minority of the medical profes-
sion, osteopathic practices followed by them, even if not the custom of
the allopathic medical profession, would be acceptable under the
law.'3' Thus, the integrity of osteopathic principles would survive but
the same school rule, which has no conceptual foundation when ap-
plied to modern osteopaths and allopaths, would be streamlined.
Historically, the same school rule is not the only aspect of the medi-
cal negligence standard of care influenced by changes in medical edu-
cation. 131 The modification of the locality rule resulted primarily from
the standardization of education and the greater availability of educa-
tional opportunities.' 32 The rule judging specialists by their own stan-
dards, and not by general standards influenced by locality or school, is
also a result of increasing uniformity and regulation of specialty educa-
tion. 33 Classifying allopathic and osteopathic physicians as one school
for purposes of medical negligence law would be a recognition of the
current state of osteopathic education in accordance with this trend.
Kelly L. Raftery
128. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 19 & 128-129 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
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